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Abstract
As new conflicts emerge, transitional justice practitioners are finding it increasingly imperative 
to incorporate the concepts of asset recovery into transitional justice processes and mechanisms. 
However, for its success, the pillar of transitional justice relating to international asset recovery 
needs strengthening. Yet a granular understanding of this dimension remains a critical blind 
spot in the transitional justice and human rights conversation. This paper brings the dynamics 
of asset recovery as an emerging aspect of human rights law to the fore. In terms of methodology 
this paper relies on Sharp’s critically motivated problem-solving theory. The paper suggests 
that for transitional justice to be holistic it should include asset recovery in its accountability 
mechanisms. Hopefully, it humbly contributes a new angle toward the understanding of what 
transitional justice can and could become.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a negative impact of the non-repatriation of funds illicitly ac-
quired to the countries of origin on the enjoyment of human rights, in particu-
lar economic, social and cultural rights.1 A research by the World Bank and 
the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) revealed that the 
trillions that are embezzled every year only a fraction of this money finds its 
way back to the jurisdictions it was stolen with the rest remaining overseas for 
decades.2 Against this background, economic crimes such as corruption and 
outright theft of public assets, and laundering of money stolen from the public 
are usually a hallmark of authoritarian regimes. Given that the connection be-
tween these economic crimes and human rights violations is now obvious; it 
has become imperative for states emerging from conflict to also recover assets 
1  Human Rights Council, Comprehensive Study On The Negative Impact Of The Non- Repatriation Of 
Funds Of Illicit Origin To The Countries Of Origin On The Enjoyment Of Human Rights, In Particular 
Economic, Social And Cultural Rights A/HRC/19/42, p. 8.
2  World Bank and OECD, Tracking Anti-corruption and Asset Recovery Commitments: A Progress Report 
and Recommendations for Action (OECD and The World Bank, 2011).
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stolen by the previous autocratic regimes.
However, asset recovery has been described as “one of the most complex 
projects in the field of law.”3 It is exceptionally difficult for those working in 
the context of failed states, widespread corruption, or with limited resources 
such as post-conflict states.4 There is every justification for that. Asset recov-
ery emphasize the multi-jurisdictional or cross-border aspects of corruption 
investigation, and includes other numerous processes such as the tracing, 
freezing, confiscation, and repatriation of proceeds stored in foreign jurisdic-
tions.5 Moreover, one of the many other challenges in asset recovery is not 
just in returning stolen assets, but in determining the conditions under which 
assets should be returned.
For countries emerging from repression and mass atrocity, transitional jus-
tice can be a solution to adapt legal mechanisms to redress massive human 
rights violations as a result of theft and plunder of public resources. This ap-
proach would not be unprecedented, as a field transitional justice has adapted 
and operationalize other legal mechanisms even under “less than auspicious 
circumstances”.6 There is, therefore room to argue that transitional justice 
can address massive looting linked to human rights violations and correct 
“the reputation” of asset recovery as a “very technical legalistic field”, and 
to generate broader understanding of its far-reaching role to foster the en-
joyment of human rights. The thrust of this paper is to advocate transitional 
justice to adopt asset recovery as a new mechanism for accountability. 
In order to avoid being unrealistic in my scientific endeavor, I draw upon, 
in terms of methodology, a recent innovative theory developed by Sharp to 
build a bridge between, theory and practice in the field of transitional jus-
tice called the ‘critically motivated problem-solving theory’.7 Sharp’s theory 
builds from Robert Cox’s widely acknowledged distinction between problem-
solving theory which is largely preservative of the status quo—take the world 
as you find it, and the critical theory, which points to possible alternative or-
ders—oriented toward changing the world.8 Put in other words, the ‘critically 
motivated problem-solving theory’ is an integrated approach to critique that 
3  Jack Smith, Mark Pieth and Guillermo Jorge,”The Recovery Of Stolen Assets: A Fundamental Principle 
Of The UN Convention Against Corruption,” U4Brief, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) – U4 (2) 
(2007).
4  Jean-Pierre Brun, et. al. Asset Recovery Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners (Washington D.C: The 
World Bank, 2011).
5  For the basic steps in asset recovery see ibid.
6  Pablo de Greiff, “Thinking Big About Transitional Justice,”  Arbeitsgemeinschaft Frieden und Entwick-
lung  September, 27, 2018,  https://www.frient.de/news/details/thinking-big-about-transitional-justice.
7  Dustin N. Sharp, “What Would Satisfy Us? Taking Stock of Critical Approaches to Trasitional Justice,” 
International Journal of Trasitional Justice 13, no. 3 (2019): 571-572.
8  Ibid., 571-572.  
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embraces “as well as” rather than “either/or explanations” by emphasizing the 
way transitional justice critique pushes thinking beyond the status quo, but 
with a greater eye to questions of feasibility and implementation .9 What this 
means in terms of my research is that rather than following suggestions for 
an alternative approach to transitional justice in the form of “transformative 
justice” as a way to redress economic justice and redistribution of wealth, I 
will argue, instead, that transitional justice can use its present accountability 
mechanisms “as well as” importing asset recovery into its mix to address these 
issues.10
This paper proceeds in five additional sections. First a discussion of the 
important terms and sets the parameters. Second, the article addresses the is-
sue contextuality in the field of transitional justice. Having set the contextual 
background, I discuss the significance of context-specificity and the possibili-
ties of new mechanisms in new conflicts, drawing primarily upon a survey by 
Olsen Tricia D, et al. using the Middle East and North Africa as a case study. 
Third, in the core section of the paper I discuss the rationality of including as-
set recovery in transitional justice. I identified five points that justifies the link-
ages between the two fields. The fourth section discusses the current approach 
to mainstream asset recovery in traditional transitional justice mechanisms. 
This paper only scratches the surface. Clearly the topics covered in each of the 
next four sections deserve much deeper analysis than it is possible to provide 
in the constraints of this paper.  
II. TERMS AND PARAMETERS
In order to advocate the inclusion of asset recovery into transitional jus-
tice, it is key, at this point to define some of the key terms that are germane for 
the central argument of this research. 
A. ASSERT RECOVERY  
Asset recovery is a relatively new area of international law. Asset recovery 
started to gain increased recognition as a result of developments that followed 
regime change in the Philippines in 1986 when Switzerland made a commit-
ment to return all  the stolen money hidden in Swiss banks by the former 
9  Ibid., 572. 
10  See in general Paul Gready and Simon Robins, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New 
Agenda for Practice,” The University of York Center for Applied Human Rights, Briefing Note TFJ-01, June 
2014; Padraig McAuliffe, Transformative Transitional Justice and the Malleability of Post-Conflict States 
(Edward Elgar 2017); Lauren Marie Balasco, “Locating Transformative Justice: Prism or Schism in Transi-
tional Justice?” International Journal of Transitional Justice 12, no. 2 (2018): 368–378. 
184
Prosper Maguchu
Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos.11 The provisions were already avail-
able in international treaty law on the restitution of cultural objects and traffic 
of drugs.12 Although the practice of asset recovery can be traced as far back 
as ancient Egypt, where, following a period of tyranny under the Pharaohs, 
the Israelites were able to use various means to recover what has been stolen 
from them.13 The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 
is the first international instrument with a dedicated section on asset recovery. 
However, neither this treaty nor any other international instrument provides a 
generic and universally recognized definition of asset recovery. 
Rhada Ivory defined asset recovery in UNCAC “as the legal process by 
which states use each other’s coercive powers to obtain or regain ownership of 
proceeds and objects of corruption or substitute assets.”14 While a good start-
ing point, this conceptualization of asset recovery is insufficiently specific for 
the purposes of state-to-state cooperation, it does not acknowledge the rights 
of the public in general, and victims in particular.15 For the purposes of this 
paper, asset recovery shall be defined broadly as the process used to recover 
for the state, the victims of corruption or duly designated third parties property 
acquired through the commission of any and all of the mandatory and non-
mandatory offences established under UNCAC. 
To that end, this paper will discuss asset recovery from a human rights-
based approach. That is to say, from the lenses of the victim population af-
fected by the theft of the assets.16 A human rights approach revolves around 
the victim. By adopting this approach to asset recovery, in consonant with 
the field of transitional justice “consistently focusing on the rights and needs 
of victims and their families”.17 Although asset recovery is quintessentially a 
criminal or adminstrative issue, there has been a shift towards a human rights-
11 Rita Adam, “Innovation in Asset Recovery: The Swiss Perspective,” in The World Bank Legal Review: 
Legal Innovation and Empowerment for Development, vol. 4, Hassane Cisse, et. al. eds. (Washongton D.C: 
The World Bank, 2013), pp. 253-264;  François Membrez and Matthieu Hösli, “How To Return Stolen As-
sets: The Swiss Policy Pathway,” Centre for Civil and Political Rights, Working Paper (2020) p. 9.
12 Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer 
of ownership of cultural property, Paris, 14 November 1970, UNTS 823, p. 231.
13 Michael Fernandez Bertier, “The History of Confiscation Laws: From the Book of Exodus to the War on 
White-Collar Crime” in Chasing Criminal Money: Challenges and Perspectives on Asset Recovery in the 
EU, Katalin Ligeti Michele Simonato, eds. (Hart Publishing, 2017), pp. 53-74
14  Radha Ivory, Corruption, Asset Recovery, and the Protection of Property in Public International Law: 
The Human Rights of Bad Guys (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), p. 27.
15 Kristian Lasslett, “Victims of corruption: Applied principles for asset recovery,” State Crime, May 15, 
2017 International State Crime Initiative,  http://statecrime.org/state-crime-research/victims-of-corruption-
applied-principles-for-asset-recovery/
16  Membrez and Hösli, “How to Return Stolen Assets,” p. 5.
17  Office of The United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights, Rule-Of-Law Tools For Post Con-
flict States National Consultations On Transitional Justice, (New York and Geneva: OHCHR, 2009), p. 1.
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centred approach since the adoption of UNCAC.18 UNCAC does not provide 
more information on how the human rights-based approach can be incorpo-
rated in asset recovery. 
Lastly, different jurisdictions have used, or still use different terminology 
to describe the same legal concept under asset recovery for example, some ju-
risdictions use “confiscation” and others use “forfeiture” also in terms of pro-
cedure, in some jurisdictions’ assets may be “seized,” whereas in others’ they 
are “restrained,” “blocked,” or “frozen”.19 This paper therefore should be read 
in the context of specific jurisdictions legal system, law enforcement struc-
tures, resources, legislation, and procedures—without being restrained by the 
terminology or the concepts used to illustrate the process of asset recovery. 
B. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
This paper is departure from the traditional use of the phrase transitional 
justice to refer to both judicial and non-judicial processes that are convention-
ally used by post authoritarian states to reckon with massive human rights 
and humanitarian law abuses and violations.20 This is because, the meaning 
of transitional justice has changed somewhat from its original definition. As 
the first United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, jus-
tice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff stated in his 
maiden report: the measures of transitional justice emerged first as practices 
and experiences in post-authoritarian settings, such as the Latin American 
countries of the Southern Cone and, to a lesser extent, those in Central and 
Eastern Europe and South Africa have been progressively transferred from 
their “place of origin” in post-authoritarian settings, to post-conflict contexts 
and even to settings in which conflict is ongoing or to those in which there has 
been no transition to speak of.21
More importantly, the UN Special Rapporteur observed that there is a 
common feature in these recent transitions, that is, the prominent role that 
claims relating to economic rights occupy in these transitions; claims against 
corruption and in favour of economic opportunities have been raised to a par 
in the regions with claims for the redress of violations of civil and political 
18  UNODC, “Documents of the Human Rights Council on the issue of the negative impact of the non-
repatriation of funds of illicit origin to the countries of origin on the enjoyment of human rights, and the im-
portance of improving international cooperation,” UNODC Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group 
on Asset Recovery, 11th intersessional meeting, Vienna, 24-25 August 2017,  CAC/COSP/WG.2/2017/
CRP.2, para. 12.
19  Brun et al.  Asset Recovery Handbook, p. 3
20 International Center for Transitional Justice, “What is Transitional Justice?” ICTJ Fact Sheet, 2009, 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf
21 Human Rights Council, Report Of The Special Rapporteur On The Promotion Of Truth, Justice, Repara-




Hence, he expressed sentiments against the increasing trend to utilize the 
measures of transitional justice without heeding the characteristics of the con-
texts in which they are applied.23 Further, the Special Rapporteur underlines 
that it is crucial to clearly identify and assess the preconditions in any given 
country and address them in a manner fine-tuned, targeted and sensitive to 
context.24 This view, as shall be discussed later, illustrates the potential of 
transitional justice and its accountability mechanisms to address eminent and 
emerging issues such as corruption and plundering of resources which is a 
growing concern even leading to regime change. 
C. ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS
The phrase accountability mechanisms and transitional justice are often 
used interchangeably without precision. However as the Encyclopedia of 
Transitional Justice warned against the use of the term loosely as a synonym 
for transitional justice since “such [a] broad definition lacks analytical clarity, 
because accountability should focus on the wrongdoers—that is, the persons 
who, in different ways (through intention, direct action, or support) contrib-
uted to wrongful actions.”25The Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice has of-
fered a new definition of accountability mechanisms: 
as institutionalized, procedurally shaped relationships between the wrong-
doer and an authoritative domestic governmental or international institution, 
where the wrongdoer is duty bound to explain his or her actions, while an 
authoritative institution has the right to pass a judgment and impose sanctions 
on the wrongdoer.26 
In this context, it is worth noting that accountability mechanisms can be 
both legal and non-legal, state-driven or civil-society-driven. The most com-
mon methods of accountability are prosecutions, truth commissions, repara-
tions, institutional reforms and amnesties.27 Further, as the next section of this 
paper shows, there has been distinguishable general trends and patterns in 
the adoption of the five accountability mechanisms across different times and 
places. 
22  Ibid., 6.
23  Ibid.
24 Ibid., 6.
25  Stan and Nedelsky, eds. Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
6.
26  Ibid.
27 Lucy Huyse, “Justice after Transition,” Law and Social Inquiry 51 (1995): 51; Neil Kritz, eds. Transi-
tional Justice, vol. I (1995), xix; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Truth, Justice and Multiple Institutions,” in Tran-
sitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century, Naomi Roht-Arriaza and J. Mariezcurrena, eds. (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2006), p. 2.
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III.CONTEXTUAL PREVALENCE AND TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 
Transitional justice is context-specific its accountability mechanisms are 
based on the needs and objectives of the context and country concerned.28 Ac-
cording to a decade old survey, transitional justice accountability mechanisms 
have been shown to be “utilized in the aftermath of virtually every period of 
repression or violence”.29 The study just mentioned, observed however that 
“notable variations exist over time, across cases, and between different po-
litical contexts, but transitional justice has persisted as a political tool to deal 
with past abuses throughout the world for most of the past four decades.”30 A 
further important observation from the research, particulary for this paper is 
that there are significant “variation across regions and transition type”. 31
What is more, the study argues that it is possible to identify factors that 
contemplate the adoption of particular accountability mechanisms, as well as 
to make an assessment of what combinations and sequences of mechanisms 
succeed in establishing peace, strengthening democracy, and reducing human 
rights violations.32 The survey makes the case for “new mechanisms as new 
conflicts and transitions occur.”33 It emphasizes that “the objectives for the 
adoption of mechanisms of transitional justice are manifold and to a large de-
gree depend on the characteristics of the transition and society in question.” 34
While the survey is a decade old, its findings can still be used to support 
the unprecedented use of asset recovery in transitional justice in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region. The conflict in the MENA regions that 
has been referred to in the literature as the fourth wave of transitional justice, 
embodies all the characteristics of a new conflict whose primary concern has 
been addressing corruption. To the extent that asset recovery became a major 
issue in the transitional justice processes of the MENA countries. 
28  ICTJ, “What is Transitional Justice?”
29  Tricia D. Olsen, “Transitional Justice in the  World, 1970-2007: Insights from a New Dataset,” Journal 
of Peace Research 47, no. 6 (2010): 807.
30  Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32  Ibid.,  808.
33 Ibid.,  808.
34  Hemi Mistry, “Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring,” Chatham House, International Law 




A. SUB CONTEXT: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND ASSET 
RECOVERY IN THE MENA 
Transitional justice in the MENA follows the uprisings, civil wars and 
mass removal of autocratic and corrupt rulers in what has become to be known 
as the “Arab Spring”.35 Based on what we know now, the Arab Spring “situ-
ation represents a unique set of circumstances requiring a different approach 
to transitional justice.”36 For instance, unlike other regions where change is 
usually based on the violation of physical violence, most scholars agree that 
the revolts in the MENA countries were instigated by the need for economic 
space—in particular the elimination of corruption.37 As Kora boldly stated “in 
the Arab context corruption was one of the main grievances motivating the 
“revolutions,” on a par with joblessness and violations of freedom and other 
rights”.38 Below is a table illustrating corruption by some of the leaders of the 
countries involved in the Arab Spring.
Table 1 Corruption by Arab countries heads of state
Head of State Estimated personal worth Notable assets
Head of state 
salary (2015) 
Muammar Gaddafi, 
Libya (1969 – 2011) £2.4-64bn
Gold-Plated cutlery, crystal 
champagne glasses, rows of 








Hotels in Egypt and numerous 




Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali, Tunisia 
(1987 – 2011)
£2.4-4bn
40 Luxury cars including a 





Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
Yemen, (1990 – 
2012)
£24-49.6bn
Luxury assets in the form of 
property, cash, gold and other 
valuable commodities are be-




35 The nomenclature Arab Spring, was “first used by Foreign Policy Magazine and then adopted by journal-
ists and activists in the US as a way to brand the revolution that has been transforming the MENA.
36  Mistry, “Transitional Justice,” p. 7.
37  IIan Peleg and Jonathan Mendilow, “Corruption and the Arab Spring Comparing the Pre and Post Spring 
Situation,” in Corruption in the Contemporary World: Theory, Practice, and Hotspots Jonathan Mendilow 
and Ilan Peleg (Lexington Books, 2014). 
38  Kora Andrieu, “Dealing with a “New” Grievance: Should Anticorruption be part of the Transitional 







Handmade furniture from 






From this table it can be seen how the leaders were not only repressive but 
also corrupt plundering large amounts of public resources. The large amounts 
of money if recovered would do a lot to redress the violations they have in-
flicted on their people. Thus, along with redressing corruption as part of the 
transitional justice issue MENA countries should also simultaneouly address 
asset recovery. The use of asset recovery legal process has gained unprec-
edented use post the 2011 Arab revolutions as the table below illustrates.
Table 2 New cases of asset recovery per year based on StaR Database39
In this context, it is worth noting that asset recovery is generally only pos-
sible when the powerful corrupt politicians have been removed from power. 
The international anti-money laundering trend setter and asset recovery in-
ternational non-governmental organisation the Financial Action Task force 
(FATF) observed:  
“In nearly all recent cases of grand corruption, the detection and investi-
gation of the criminal activity of heads of government occurred only after 
there was a change of government, specific corrupt individuals fell out 
of favour, or there was widespread public outcry after wrongdoing was 
39  Mathis Lohaus, “Asset “recovery and illicit financial flows from a developmental perspective: Concepts, 




publicly exposed. While the PEPs [politically Exposed Persons] were in 
power, there was no real opportunity for domestic law enforcement agen-
cies to investigate their financial crimes.”40 
It is no coincidence that the years following the Arab Spring has been 
identified as the milestone year for asset recovery with many countries from 
the MENA engaged in various processes to recover assets from disposed lead-
ers. 
One of which was the establishment of the Arab Forum on Asset Recovery 
(AFAR) an initiative in support of asset recovery efforts by Arab countries 
to bring together post-revolution governments with governments of countries 
that had frozen the assets of former leaders of the regimes. AFAR also works 
as a platform bringing together the Arab countries in transition, with key glob-
al and regional financial centers, to foster international cooperation for the 
return of stolen assets. Therefore, AFAR had a dual mandate to address the 
key challenging issues of Arab States in recovering assets, as well as serving 
as a forum for practical action and cooperation. 
AFAR has successfully mobilized both policy makers and practitioners, 
generating political momentum, raising awareness of effective measures for 
asset recovery, promoting domestic coordination and facilitating international 
cooperation on cases. Additionally, it has also provided training and guidance 
to increase the capability of law enforcement and other officials in asset recov-
ery. However, despite making progress, AFAR has failed to address the ques-
tion of asset recovery in transitional justice. Performance of AFAR’s work is 
limited because it “continues to revolve around theoretical approaches instead 
of practical mechanisms to recover the ill-gotten assets. This undermines the 
potential results that the yearly forums could have produced.”41
This provides some explanation as to why despite the show of commit-
ment by many countries to AFAR, the results have been underwhelming. For 
instance, it is believed that the former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and 
his family and friends all accused of corruption owned millions of pounds 
of assets in the UK but the UK government has been unable to recover these 
illicitly acquired funds.42  Similarly, although, in the aftermath of the Arab 
40  FATF, Specific Risk Factors in Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption: Assistance to Reporting Insti-
tutions (FATF/OECD, June 2012) p. 10, para 26. Available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/docu-
ments/reports/Specific%20Risk%20Factors%20in%20the%20Laundering%20of%20Proceeds%20of%20
Corruption.pdf
41 Transparency International, “Transparency International and MENA Chapters Lament Lack Of Progress 
On Asset Recovery In Arab World,” Transparency International 15 December 2015, https://www.trans-
parency.org/news/pressrelease/transparency_international_and_mena_chapters_lament_lack_of_prog-
ress_on_ass.
42 Transparency International, “Just One House Recovered by UK From Arab Spring States,” Transparency 
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Spring in 2011, Switzerland froze money belonging to former Egyptian presi-
dent Mubarak and his cronies. In August 2017, after six years of investigation, 
Swiss judicial authorities stopped cooperating with the new Egyptian govern-
ment before any of the assets were recovered. 
Taken together, these two cases provide brief insights into the challenges 
of asset recovery. Some of the key challenges include proving the illegal-
ity of the assets. Hence, it has been argued that for countries emerging from 
autocracy and dictatorship of plunder, the size of the amounts should be suf-
ficient to demonstrate its illicit origin.43 A report Failed Recovery lays bare 
the inadequacy of the States for dealing with money from dictators, failing to 
enable stolen assets to be recovered. The report also exposes the hypocrisy of 
international banks, that accept funds of illicit origins in the first place, then 
take advantages of legal technicalities to return them.44
The Chatham report on transitional justice in the MENA after the Arab 
Spring concluded by saying that “The Arab Spring has the potential to be a 
source of innovation in the field of transitional justice, by also bringing into 
focus accountability also for economic and financial wrong-doing.”45 
IV. RATIONALITY OF INCLUDING ASSET RECOVERY IN 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
There is lack of clarity in the literature on how the field of transitional 
justice has adopted its accountability mechanisms. This is primarily because 
the issue was often framed as a question of peace versus justice, earlier dis-
cussions tended to center around the question of whether transitional states 
should utilize criminal justice processes or other measures such as truth com-
missions and reparations when dealing with past abuses.46 Further research is 
needed to better understand the rational underlying the choice of accountabil-
ity mechanisms in the field of transitional justice. 
Meanwhile, there is emerging literature on the contextually of the field 
International, 24 November 2016, https://www.transparency.org.uk/press-releases/just-one-house-recov-
ered-by-uk-from-arab-spring-states/.
43 Public Eye, “Failed Recovery: How Switzerland Released the Funds of A Famous Egyptian Crony,” Pub-
lic Eye, October 2017, https://www.publiceye.ch/fileadmin/doc/Finanzplatz/2017_PublicEye_Failed_Re-
covery_Report.pdf
44  Public Eye, “A new report exposes the difficulties of the Mubarak asset recovery,” Public Eye, 25 Octo-
ber 2017, https://www.publiceye.ch/en/news/detail/a-new-report-exposes-the-difficulties-of-the-mubarak-
asset-recovery.
45  Mistry, “Transitional Justice”
46  See e.g. José Zalaquett, “Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations,” in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, Naomi Roht-Arriaza and J. Mariezcurrena, eds. (Cambridge: CUP, 2006).
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and the choice of mechanism including as highlighted above the potential 
to have new mechanisms in new conflicts. Literature on sub-Saharan Africa 
comes close to discuss the origins of some mechanisms. For instance, al-
though less discussed sub-Saharan Africa has introduced community-based 
or ‘traditional’ justice mechanisms, where local conflict-resolution and heal-
ing practices are adapted to address grave human rights violations and have 
since been established as an integral mechanism through which to implement 
transitional justice.47 
In the next sections is a discussion on the rationality of including asset 
recovery in transitional justice. I have identified five grounds to justify the 
inclusion. This categorization does not aim to be comprehensive or free from 
overlaps, or indeed to exhaust the ways in which such interactions could or 
should be described for a variety of purposes. Rather, it aims to provide an 
analytical framework based on distinct degrees of causal proximity between 
asset recovery and transitional justice and, in doing so, to facilitate the identi-
fication of pattern-specific measures for addressing of human rights violations 
in environments affected by corruption 
A. CREATING AND OPERATIONALIZING THE NEW RIGHT 
TO ASSET RECOVERY 
De Greiff has made remarkable comments on how the field of transition-
al justice has expanded and developed international law mechanisms to suit 
the situations of transitional countries and in the process operationalize some 
rights. According to De Greiff, transitional justice has contributed to the en-
trenchment of rights to justice, truth, and reparations, precisely by offering 
concrete and practical means for the operationalization of these rights. I look 
at these rights briefly in seriatim below. 
In terms of the right to justice, transitional justice has found ways of cop-
ing with amnesties often adopted by outgoing regimes to shield members from 
the consequences of their violations; it has contributed to the articulation of 
prosecutorial strategies to maximize the efficacy in the deployment of scarce 
investigatory and prosecutorial resources (more often than not in hostile en-
47  A. Triponel and S. Pearson. “What do you think should happen? Public participation in transitional jus-
tice,” Pace International Law Review 22, no. 1 (2010): 103–44; T. Allen, and A. Macdonald, A. “Post-con-
flict traditional justice: A critical overview,” LSE JSRP Paper no. 3 (2013).  Available at http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/56357/1/JSRP_Paper3_Postconflict_traditional_justice_Allen_Macdonald_2013.pdf;  for contrast 
see N. Valji, “Tensions between peace and justice in transitional contexts,” in Rights-Based Approaches 
and Humanitarian Interventions In Conflict Situations (InterAgency Group on Rights, 2009), pp. 27–37, 
available at  http://conflict.care2share.wikispaces.net/file/detail/Rights%20in%20Conflict%20FINAL.doc; 
P. Gready, & S. Robins, “From transitional to transformative justice: A new agenda for practice,” Interna-
tional Journal of Transitional Justice 8 (1) (2014): 339–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/iju013. 
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vironments); and it has invited experimentation with different venues where 
justice can be sought, from national to hybrid to international tribunals.48 
Similarly, transitional justice has contributed to the entrenchment of the 
right to truth, operationalizing it through the measure that has become al-
most synonymous with it, the truth commission, but also through other means 
such as commissions of inquiry, the organization and preservation of archives 
and other documentation efforts, as well as through carefully designed memo-
rialization initiatives.49 
In the context of the right to reparations transitional justice has contributed 
to the entrenchment of the right to reparation through the creation of massive 
administrative reparations programs that have served tens of thousands of vic-
tims in different countries, and through the wise use of ‘complex’ bundles of 
benefits that satisfy a more diverse set of needs than one form of reparation 
alone.50
Although asset recovery is not yet seen as an autonomous human right; 
so is, for instance, the right to truth. There is no consensus on its source some 
argue that the right derives from other well-established rights in international 
human rights law, such as the right to a remedy, the right to receive and impart 
information, and the right to due process.51 Others say it is a stand-alone right, 
independent of or in addition to these other rights.52 Ironically, this has led to 
some doubts about the normative content of the right to truth and its param-
eters as “somewhere above a good argument and somewhere below a clear 
legal rule.”53 As stated above transitional justice has operationalized this right 
in relation families of victims of enforced disappearances in Latin America in 
the 1970s.54 Likewise, transitional justice can operationalize and adapt asset 
recovery as a right for victims of massive state looting.
B. A BROADER AND HOLISTIC JUSTICE
Transitional justice as a field has come under attack from the emerging gen-
eration of critical scholars for ignoring structural violence, failing to address 
every day issues and delivering economic justice. The ensuing debate largely, 
48  de Greiff, “Thinking Big About Transitional Justice”
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid. 
51 Eduardo González and Howard Varney (eds.), Truth Seeking Elements of Creating an Effective Truth 
Commission (ICTJ 2013), p. 3.
52  Ibid.
53 Yasmin Naqvi, “The Right to the Truth in International Law: Fact or Fiction?” International Review of 
the Red Cross 88 (2006): 273.
54  Patricia Naftali, “Crafting a “Right to Truth” in International Law: Converging Mobilizations, Diverging 
Agendas?” Penal Field (2016): 3.
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though not solely, split scholars along a “continuum [that] runs from thinner 
and shorter-term projects focused on comparatively gross and crude forms 
of violence such as murder and torture, to thicker and longer-term projects 
that also engage with comparatively subtle forms of violence such as cultural 
and structural violence.”55 This paper is not about developing a well-rounded 
understanding of the ongoing debate for a broader “thicker” and holistic tran-
sitional justice. Rather, it does accept that transitional justice for it to succeed 
as a field it needs to take into account issues such as structural violence and 
economic justice. It proposes that for transitional justice to deliver its intended 
goals it needs to be expand its remit of accountability mechanisms to include 
asset recovery as a way to address structural violence and economic justice. 
It is characteristic of the new governments that takes after a dictatorship 
to talk about corruption committed by the ousted regime but without showing 
any concrete evidence of it. As stated by Nye, that corruption is a charge that 
follows the overthrow of a regime is a typical developing country.56 A report 
by Freedom House revealed that “corruption and its links to human rights 
abuses can help a society break from its authoritarian past, dispel conceptions 
of the former ruler as “harsh but clean,” and set longer-term institutional re-
form on the right footing.”57
Thus, one of the justifications for the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
to mainstream asset recovery in its work is confirmation that the process can 
lead to deeper justice because: “Financial investigations may provide signifi-
cant and valuable information pertaining to cases before the Court.”58 In ad-
dition to the obvious and yet important role of using financial information to 
“serve as evidence and potentially contribute to demonstrating the elements of 
a crime or determining an individual’s criminal responsibility.” 59
By adding asset recovery to accountability mechanisms this can lead to a 
broader and holistic justice. For instance, recovering assets illicitly acquired 
by corrupt dictators can assist citizens to understand the crimes of the past. 
For instance, as Carranza noted “by exposing the extent of corruption or the 
scale of economic crimes, these mechanisms would reveal that the depth of 
the damage caused by perpetrators goes beyond violence directed against their 
55  Sharp, “What Would Satisfy Us?” 580-581
56  J. S. Nye, “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” The American Political 
Science Review 61, no. 2 (1967): 417-427. doi:10.2307/1953254. 
57 Freedom House, “Combating Impunity: Transitional Justice and Anti-Corruption: Conclusions from 
Practitioners’ Dialogues on Transitional Justice,” Freedom House, 2014, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/
default/files/Combating%20Impunity%20-%20Transitional%20Justice%20and%20Anti-Corruption.pdf.
58  International Criminal Court, “Financial Investigations and Recovery of Assets,” p. 1. https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/other/Freezing_Assets_Eng_Web.pdf.
59  International Criminal Court, “Financial Investigations,” p. 1.
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opponents or against citizens targeted by repressive measures.”60  In the same 
way recovery of assets can serve as the proof of looting and other serious fi-
nancial crimes which tend to be enshrouded in anecdotes and can sometimes 
be abused for political capital. 
C. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The political economy of transitional justice remains understudied by 
scholars and practitioners. Drawing on the Transitional Justice Data Base, a 
study was designed to test “the existing assumptions concerning the political 
economy of transitional justice in the literature”.61 
The questions this study sought to determine was whether democratic 
leaders are less likely to adopt costly transitional justice mechanisms rather 
than cheaper ones in countries that face economic constraints?62 Alternatively, 
will transitional justice choices depend not on domestic economic issues, but 
rather on international pressure to comply with an accountability norm? 63 The 
findings clearly indicated that “the sets of political economy trade-offs that 
new democracies face in balancing the pressures of the domestic economy 
and international norms.”64 The study concluded “that a political economy 
of transitional justice exists and that a country’s economic health shapes its 
transitional justice choices.”65
An important implication of these results on justice is that the most ex-
pensive mechanisms such as prosecutions and trials are shunned for the least 
expensive mechanisms such as amnesties. In other words, impunity can be 
reinforced by the lack of resources. 
A question can be asked about the role of international actors in financ-
ing transitional justice. Surprising results shows that contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the international community’s economic or political incentives do 
not offset the costs of transitional justice enough to encourage poorer coun-
tries to adopt mechanisms that are more expensive than would otherwise be 
feasible.66 It turns out that the literature on transitional justice exaggerated the 
role that international factors play in promoting transitional justice? At least in 
60  Ruben Carranza, “Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic 
Crimes?” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 310-330. https://doi.org/10.1093/
ijtj/ijn023.
61 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, “At What Cost? The Political Economy of Tran-








political economy terms, it appears so.67 
Moreover, the costs of can be far-reaching than they appear. Ironically, 
transitional justice signals to the international community that a state has put 
its barbaric past behind it and joined the community of modern nations, and 
thus deserves the corresponding economic benefits of that new status. Elster 
was obvioulsy correct to suggest that failing to address past atrocities may 
prove costlier for new democracies than implementing transitional justice.68 
As shall be discussed in the next section, asset recovery can provide a source 
of funding for transitional justice mechanisms and processes. 
D. SUPPORTING THEORY WITH PRACTICE 
The ongoing ad-hoc practice is as important a clue to our understanding 
of the need to officially recognise asset recovery as part of the accountability 
mechanisms. It indicates the new demands that can assist to make transitional 
justice thrive as a field. As noted above, one of the issues that transitional 
justice is facing as a field are demands for a thicker and more holistic mecha-
nisms that is able to address everyday socioeconomic issues in other ways 
more practical forms of justice.  
Asset recovery has gained recognition following the regime change in 
Philippines and has since then been steadily increasing following other simi-
lar cases such as Mobutu Sese Seko and Sani Abacha in Zaire and Nigeria 
respectively. The two latest examples is the Commission on Corruption and 
Asset Recovery, established by President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih to inves-
tigate acts of corruption which took place within state institutions during the 
administration of his predecessor in Maldives and the Sudanese  Anti-Corrup-
tion and Regime Dismantling Committee former President Omar al-Bashir, 
his family members and associates.
Moreover, asset recovery continues to draw attention in the area of inter-
national law; the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have crystalized 
and magnified recovering of assets to support development in target 16.4. The 
SDGs indicates how asset recovery plays a critical role in strengthening some 
of the key foundations of sustainable development, such as the rule of law 
and strong, transparent and accountable institutions. In addition, the UN has 
been calling for the human rights-based approach to asset recovery processes 
through UNCAC chapter V. 
In parallel, other key non state actors such as international NGOs are 
67  Ibid.
68  Jon Elster, Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006). 
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working on asset recovery to redress human rights violations. One such ex-
ample is Redress an organization to assist victims of torture and ill-treatment 
is currently engaged on a project on asset recovery to assist victims of torture. 
Redress has recently launched a new initiative to respond to the connection 
between grand corruption and torture, by taking action to seize the corrupt 
assets of high-profile torturers and have them assigned as reparations for the 
benefit of their victims. 
E. LASTING PEACE
As is known, central to the adoption of transitional justice in any jurisdic-
tion is the concept of forging lasting peace and non-repetition which is often 
expressed in the mantra “never again” to massive human rights abuses. A good 
example is the adoption of truth commissions which are regarded as essential 
to achieve long-lasting peace.69 A notable example is the truth commission of 
Argentina for the disappeared whose final report was aptly named Nunca Más 
(Never Again). The Latin phrase was adopted by several countries in Latin 
America as a promise to never again allow such campaigns of widespread and 
systematic human rights violations to take place.
It is only recently that the link between corruption and organized crime 
with the commission of human rights and humanitarean rights attrocities has 
become growingly more evident. For instance, it has become increasingly ob-
vious that there is a financial motivation both to initiate wars and to commit 
war crimes as part of belligerent organizations.70 
However, asset recovery remains uncommon in war crimes and crimes 
against humanity cases.71 In light of the financial motivations behind warfare, 
asset recovery operations should be a key component of war crimes litigation, 
in order to both deter and punish those who engage in such crimes for financial 
reasons.72 Encouragingly, there is some evidence that a new focus on asset 
recovery in the war crimes context may be emerging at both the national and 
international levels to deter the commission of crimes that are linked to mass 
attrocities.73
An example is the ICC which has incorporated asset recovery among oth-
er reasons because “it is crucial for accountability and to ensure that ‘crime 
does not pay’, in the event that the person is sentenced to the payment of fines 
69 For the contrary see Eduardo González, Elena Naughton, and Félix Reátegui, Challenging the Conven-
tional Can Truth Commissions Strengthen Peace Processes? (International Center for Transitional Justice 
and and the Kofi Annan Foundation, 2014).






and/ or the forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indi-
rectly from the crime.”74 It goes without saying that the forfeiture of proceeds, 
property and assets directly derived from crime hinders the opportunity for 
their reinvestment into further commission of crimes thus preventing a relapse 
into violence. It also dissuades would be offenders from engaging in massive 
looting as it shows that all will be in vain. Therefore, if the commitment of 
‘Nunca Más’ is to be fully realised asset recovery can assist to deter future 
commission of crimes and thus it is in tandem with the transitional justice 
goals of non-recurrence.
 V. CURRENT APPROACHES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
MECHANISMS TO ASSET RECOVERY
So far, this paper has discussed why it may be significant to have asset 
recovery as a mechanism of transitional justice. This section of the paper will 
discuss the ways in which attempts to align and mainstream asset recovery 
as part of the redress of massive human rights violations by corrupt dictators 
have been made. To this end, it presents an overview of the current approaches 
to asset recovery in transitional justice which is using traditional accountabil-
ity mechanisms such as truth commissions, amnesties, and prosecutions and 
so forth and their limitations, arguing for the adoption of asset recovery as a 
new mechanism on its own in transitional justice. 
A. TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
Truth commissions, which are often seen as the most iconic mechanisms 
of transitional justice75, have unsurprisingly been used to mainstream asset 
recovery. Truth commissions were traditionally designed to investigate the 
violation of civil and political rights.76 Nonetheless, as transitional justice 
evolve truth commissions mandate has been widened to address not only so-
cioeconomic rights but also related issues such as corruption. In fact, some 
truth commissions have only focused on corruption and recovering assets.77
However, a truth commission should primarily focus on the broader objec-
tive of establishing how economic crimes, provided that is part of its mandate, 
were committed. If it is able to establish the patterns of economic crimes, and 
74  International Criminal Court, “Financial Investigations,” p. 1.
75  OHCHR, Rule-Of-Law Tools
76  Ibid.
77  Bangladesh Truth and Accountability Commission which would allow corrupt officials and businessmen 
guilty of corruption to avoid jail by confessing and returning money taken; Philippines Truth Commission 
was tasked to investigate allegations of large-scale corruption, of the previous administration under Presi-
dent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.  
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perhaps begin the task of identifying individuals and institutions responsible, 
It is only then it may be able to build the national and public support for the 
usually long and challenging process of asset recovery that should happen 
parallel to, but also beyond, the truth-seeking process. 
For instance, in Tunisia the transitional government established the Na-
tional Commission for Investigating Corruption and Embezzlement (NCICM) 
and the technical National Committee for the Recovery of Misappropriated 
Assets:
“in charge of bringing to light cases of corruption and embezzlement 
committed by or in the interest of any person or business, whether public 
of private, or a group of people, thanks to this persons/business/group of 
people’s position in the government or the administration, or thanks to 
one’s kinship, alliance, or any other relation of any nature with a state 
official or a group of state officials, especially during the period from 7 
November 1987 to 14 January 2011.”78 
The NCICM has so far managed to freeze the assets of people belonging 
to the family and inner circle of the former president at an estimated value of 
$13 billion. The value of the confiscated assets has been estimated at 25 per-
cent of the 2011 Tunisian gross domestic product.79
Moreover, a truth commission may not be the ideal way to try and recover 
assets, because that will take a number of years, likely to be more years than 
a truth commission should be in existence. Truth commissions by nature are 
established for a limited duration, according to Hayner the typical life of a 
truth commission is 2 years.80 Otherwise the commission can go on for too 
long, lose focus and momentum, and ultimately cease to interest the public. 
Experience indicates that a period of one and a half to two and a half years of 
operation is generally desirable. 81 
In deed a truth commission can bring political support and public acknowl-
edgment of the commission of economic crimes and the complicity of persons 
and institutions involved, so that the longer effort to recover assets has public 
backing and can generate the kind of political will that is required if pursuing 
assets is going to be a long time process. On the other hand, asset recovery is 
a lengthy legal process that may several years from the launch of investiga-
78  Tunisia, Decree Law 2011-7, Art. 2.
79  See Transparency International “Lost Billions”
80  Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 
2nd Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
81 OHCHR, Rule-Of-Law Tools
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tions to the judgment confiscating and returning the stolen assets.82 As stated 
above when Ferdinand Marcos was ousted from power in 1986 in the Philip-
pines, the new administration set up the PCGG for the recovery of ill-gotten 
wealth accumulated by former president and his cronies, whether located in 
the Philippines or abroad. Its legal basis has had to be renewed several times 
something that will not be possible for a truth commission.83 
B. AMNESTIES
Amnesties are predominantly to address physical human right abuses in 
post-conflict contexts to foster stability and ensure a non-violent political 
transition. There have been recent examples in transitional countries to use 
amnesties for economic crimes and corruption.84  Granting amnesties in cases 
of corruption, however, has been exceptional and also mainly envisaged for 
contexts of political transitions when the new governments are willing to have 
a fresh start and make a clean break from the past.85 
The use of amnesties in corruption is supported in international law for 
instance UNCAC states that:
“Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to encourage persons 
who participate or who have participated in the commission of an offence 
established in accordance with this Convention to supply information use-
ful to competent authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes 
and to provide factual, specific help to competent authorities that may 
contribute to depriving offenders of the proceeds of crime and to recover-
ing such proceeds.”86 
Similarly, practitioners believe that while amnesty for human rights viola-
tions have often immediately (and justifiably) triggered concerns that they en-
82  World Bank 
83  Executive Order No. 1 (February 28, 1986), as amended by EO 13, created the Presidential Commis-
sion on Good Government (PCGG) under the Office of the President (OP).; Executive Order No. 14 (May 
7, 1986), as amended by EO 14-A, defined jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of the 
Marcoses, close relatives and associates; Executive Order No. 286 (July 25, 1987) created the Seques-
tered Assets Disposition Authority (SADA) under OP to oversee the disposition of assets and properties 
recovered by the government, including those voluntarily surrendered to the PCGG; Executive Order No. 
149 (December 28, 1993) transferred the SADA from the Office of the President to the PCGG; Executive 
Order No. 643 (July 27, 2007) placed the PCGG under the administrative supervision of the Department 
of Justice (DOJ).
84  Marie Chene, “The use of amnesties for corruption offences,” U4 Helpdesk Answer 2019: 16, https://
www.u4.no/publications/the-use-of-amnesties-for-corruption-offences.pdf
85  UNODC.  “Tool #34: Amnesty, Immunity and Mitigation of Punishment,” UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit 
(UNDOC, 2004).
86  See, for example, United Nations Convention against Corruption, New York, 31 October 2003, UNTS 
vol. 2349, p. 41., art. 37(1).
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courage impunity with respect to human rights violations, a similar approach 
with respect to large-scale corruption and economic crimes may not be as 
controversial, especially if it results in the recovery of assets amassed through 
those crimes.87
On the other hand, impunity can be perpetuated by amnesties that seek 
to guarantee asset recovery and, in the process, derail the aims of transitional 
justice. The example of Tunisia is very illustrative. Tunisia had two mecha-
nisms to deal with corruption crimes: first, through prosecutions and second, 
the Truth and Dignity Commission that had a mandate to investigate corrup-
tion crimes, arbitrate on these cases, or refer them for prosecution. It later 
adopted a controversial law granting “reconciliation” to public officials in-
volved in corruption—the Economic Reconciliation Act. The law established 
a new committee that would examine requests for restitution submitted by 
these public officials and evaluate the sums of money to be repaid.88 The law 
put an end the roles of both the commission and the justice system. The justice 
system was not able to prosecute for corruption anyone who obtains amnesty 
through a “reconciliation commission”. As a result, financial and corruption 
cases were removed from the jurisdiction of the Commission as well. The new 
law enabled government agents involved in corruption cases to benefit from 
an amnesty and immunity from prosecution, undermining efforts to eradicate 
corruption and goals for transitional justice in Tunisia.89
C. PROSECUTIONS
Although, asset recovery remains uncommon in prosecutions for mass 
criminality that is typically associated with transitional justice. There is an 
increasing recognition that there is financial motivations behind some attroci-
ties, this in turn has increased the attention to include asset recovery as a key 
component of prosecutions, in order to both deter and punish those who en-
gage in such crimes for financial reasons. Actually, there is some evidence that 
a new focus on asset recovery in the war crimes context may be emerging at 
both the national and international levels.90
The ICC is one exemplary international court that from the beginning has 
observed the interplay between asset recovery and mass attrocities. Among 
the penalties provided for in the ICC statute is the ‘forfeiture of proceeds, 
87  Carranza, “Plunder and Pain,” 310–330. 
88  CIFAR, “Is Tunisia reconciliating with the corrupt?”, CIFAR, 22 September 2017, https://cifar.eu/tuni-
sia-reconciliating-corrupt/
89  Amna Guellali, “The Law That Could be the Final Blow to Tunisia’s Transition,” Human Rights Watch, 
May 23, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/23/law-could-be-final-blow-tunisias-transition.
90  Erik Larson and Max Matthews, “The Use of Asset Recovery in War Crimes Cases,” Sarajevo Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Review 1, no. 1 (2012): 18.
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property and assets derived directly or in-directly from that crime.’91 Thus, 
perpetrators who amassed assets through the crimes and human rights viola-
tions for which they are convicted can be held accountable not just for those 
crimes expressly within the ICC’s jurisdiction but also for economic crimes. 
For instance, in the issuance of an arrest warrant for Thomas Lubanga, the 
ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber requested that states trace, freeze or seize Lubanga’s 
assets.92 
Similarly, the special ad hoc procedure called the Extraordinary African 
Chambers (EAC) established within the Senegalese courts by agreement be-
tween the African Union and the government of Senegal with the mandate to 
judge those most responsible for the crimes committed in Chad between 1982 
and 1990 passed the verdict and ordered Habre ́ to pay approximately US$154 
million to 7,396 named victims. The EAC ordered for a trust fund to be cre-
ated with the mandate to search for and seize Habre ́’s assets for the purposes 
of funding the reparations.
Reliance on prosecutions alone can lead to conclusions that are ill-in-
formed and even inconsistent with the notions of justice. Non-conviction 
based (NCB) asset forfeiture, a procedure that provides for the seizure and 
forfeiture of stolen assets without the need for a criminal conviction is an-
other critical tool for recovering the proceeds of corruption best suited for 
transitional justice situations. Particularly NCB asset forfeiture can be essen-
tial when the wrongdoer is dead, is immune from prosecution or has fled the 
jurisdiction.93 In the case of using NCB asset forfeiture in situations where the 
wrongdoer has fled the jurisdiction, states can avoid trials in absentia which 
are considered to be a parody of justice.
D. REPARATIONS
Seizing illicit assets for reparations has been shown to occur in many dif-
ferent transitions. In Sierra Leone the proceeds of plundered resources were 
used as a source of funding for reparations to victims. In Peru, some of the as-
sets taken back from Alberto Fujimori were also used to fund reparations pro-
grams. The Philippines, passed a law to sets aside one third of the assets recov-
ered from the Marcos family to fund the reparations programme.94Likewise, 
91  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UNTS vol. 2187, p. 3, Art. 77(2)
(b).
92 ICC, Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Decision on the implementation of the request to freeze assets, ICC-01/09-
02/11-931, T.Ch. V(b), 8 July 2014
93  Theodore S. Greenberg et. al, A Good Practice Guide for Non-conviction-based Asset Forfeiture (Wash-
ington D. C: The World Bank, 2009). 
94  Ruben Carranza, “Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic 




following the Arab Spring countries are exploring opportunities to use assets 
as reparations. In Tunisia the government is exploring the possibility of using 
assets that are recovered from Ben Ali and his family to fund reparations for 
communities in the that have been targeted for repression and marginalization 
during his dictatorship.95
According to freedom house “following transition the new governments 
must act swiftly to identify ill-gotten assets and restore them to state coffers as 
a form of reparations to help meet the needs of victims and society at large.”96 
Several other organizations as well as pro bono law firms have taken the lead 
and are assisting states in transition to recover assets for reparations of vic-
tims. The ICC asset recovery objectives argues that “pursuant to the Rome 
Statute, the Court may order reparations to victims, for which the convicted 
person is personally liable. Securing an accused’s assets may be crucial for a 
meaningful award of reparations to victims.”97 
To be clear, channeling recovered assets directly into reparation pro-
grammes has its advantages. In deed once it is made clear that asset recov-
ered from the previous regime will be spent and the public understands that 
they will be specifically spent for victims of human rights violations. There is 
widely held belief that this can generate enough backing and enough public 
support for that objective than if you just say those assets will just go back 
to the treasury or go back to the government, because then everyone will be 
concerned about how those assets could be lost again through corruption.
Yet funds recovered from ill-gotten assets of disposed leaders can also 
be used for other transitional justice processes and programmes. In practice, 
those who are responsible for designing reparations programmes are unlikely 
to be responsible for designing policies dealing, for example, with truth-telling 
or institutional reform. They concentrate on the design of programmes that are 
organized mainly around the distinction between material and symbolic mea-
sures and their individual or collective distribution. Rather than understanding 
“reparations” in terms of the wide range of measures that can provide legal 
redress for violations, it is as if they understood it more narrowly, in terms of 
whatever set of measures can be implemented to provide benefits to victims 
directly. Implicit in this difference is a useful distinction between measures 
that may have reparative effects, and may be obligatory as well as important 
(such as the punishment of perpetrators or institutional reforms), but do not 
95  ICTJ, “Three Years After Revolution, Tunisia Seek Justice Through Collective Reparation and Devel-
opment,” ICTJ, December 18, 2013, https://www.ictj.org/news/tunisia-collective-reparation-and-develop-
ment
96  Freedom House, “Combating Impunity”
97  International Criminal Court, “Financial Investigations,” p. 1.
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distribute a direct benefit to the victims themselves, and those that do, “repara-
tions” strictly speaking. 98
Reparations in these contexts must not only do justice to the victims, but 
also contribute to re-establishing essential systems of norms, including norms 
of justice, which are inevitably weakened during times of conflict or authori-
tarianism. In Peru, a special fund, El Fondo Especial de Administracio ́n del 
Dinero Obtenido Ilicitamente en Perjuicio del Estado (FEDADOI), was cre-
ated to govern the use of assets confiscated from Fujimori and his close as-
sociates. Under the FEDADOI law, recovered assets have been used for both 
anticorruption and transitional justice measures, including truth seeking and 
reparations. The truth commission hearings in Peru, coming off revelations of 
widespread corruption by the Fujimori regime, created the political conditions 
that prompted Switzerland and the US to return to Peru $77 million and $20.2 
million in ill-gotten assets, respectively. 
E. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
The most evident and yet the least discussed inter-linkage is between as-
set recovery and institutional reforms. Quite clearly, asset recovery plays a 
critical role in strengthening some of the key foundations of sustainable de-
velopment, such as the rule of law and strong, transparent and accountable 
institutions. 99 It also enables the strengthening of embryonic, and otherwise 
weak institutions such as a free media, strong political parties and civil society 
which ultimately will result in the emergence of a stronger culture and tradi-
tion of political participation. 
This is because, asset recovery goes beyond the monetary value of the 
assets in question. They have the potential to deliver a broader understand-
ing of justice that takes into account a range of victims’ needs and societal 
priorities.100Pfister draws a distinction between “hard assets” which are actual 
assets from “soft assets” to refer to steps and elements of country systems 
that are needed to ensure an effective return of assets. The former typically 
includes the stolen funds, while the latter ranges from the capacity of law en-
forcement institutions to the political will to fight criminal networks, provides 
a powerful foundation for sustainable development.101 
There is now no doubt that a well-functioning and effective asset recovery 
98 OHCHR, Rule of Law Tools
99  Mike Pfister , “Recovering Assets In Support Of The SDGs From Soft To Hard Assets For Develop-
ment,” Basel Institute on Governance Working Paper no. 29 (2019), available at https://www.baselgover-
nance.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/WP29_AssetRecovery_SDGs.pdf
100  ICTJ, “On Solid Ground: Building Sustainable Peace and Development After Massive Human Rights 
Violations,” Working Group on Transitional Justice,  ICTJ, May, 2019, p. 5.
101  Pfister, “Recovering Assets”
205
Borders and Boundaries
system has favourable impacts on the prevention of widespread corruption 
and should be used as one of several corruption- prevention mechanisms. The 
more stolen asset return is aligned with standards of integrity, transparency, 
and accountability, the harder it becomes to divert assets or carry out corrupt 
acts. In this regard, the asset return process may support the establishment 
and enforcement of rule of law and prevent further corrupt practices in the 
country of asset origin. As is well known, fewer acts of corruption mean fewer 
corruption-related human rights violations.102
 VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper sets out how the concept of asset recovery can be utlized in 
situations where corruption and plunder are part of the violations and abuses, 
through context-specific measures that promotes transitional justice. Asset re-
covery is already been seen as an integral part of human rights and develop-
ment and therefore should also be embedded in the transitional justice mix as 
an accountability mechanism in its own right. Transitional justice does not 
have the luxury to that it “clumsily applies the same thinking and tools across 
a range of contexts and transition types as if they were the same thing.”103 
Its future of as a field depend on its innovative and creativity to adapt new 
mechanisms. 
102 Membrez and Hösli, “How to Return Stolen Assets,” p. 5.
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